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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JEROME K. DUNCAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
EILEEN M. HOWARD, SANDRA 
THORDERSON, and LARRY 
THORDERSON, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 950227-CA 
Oral Argument Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT EILEEN HOWARD 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal as of right from a final award of custody in 
a civil district court case. Jurisdiction is conferred on this 
court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (i) (Supp. 1995). The 
Paternity Order appealed from was entered February 8, 1995. (R. 
427-28.) The Thordersons' notice of appeal (R. 436) was filed 
March 6, 1995, within 3 0 days of the order appealed from, and was 
thus timely. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). Eileen Howard's notice of 
appeal (R. 444) was filed March 17, 1995,* within 14 days after the 
Thordersons' notice of appeal, and was thus timely. Utah R. App. 
P. 4(d). 
xThe filing stamp on the notice of appeal erroneously indicates 
the document was filed March 20, 1995. By order entered May 12, 
1995, the trial court decreed that the notice was actually filed 
March 17, 1995. (R. 489.) 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Eileen Howard adopts all the issues and supporting arguments 
made by Thordersons. She also presents the following additional 
issues: 
1. Did the trial court err in holding that Hutchison v. 
Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982), required a change of custody 
after five years with the mother and maternal grandparents, 
notwithstanding compelling evidence that the best interests of the 
child would be served only by maintaining the existing custody 
arrangement? This is a legal issue and is reviewed for correct-
ness. Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979). Howard 
is not aware of any requirement that this issue be raised below, 
but the issue was raised, prior to entry of final judgment, in 
Thordersons Motion for Reconsideration. (R. 396-98.) 
2. Did the trial court exercise its discretion based on a 
misunderstanding of the law, and thereby abuse its discretion, by 
holding that it lacked authority to enforce an order of custody to 
Eileen Howard contingent on her living with the Thordersons, and 
therefore refusing to consider any award of custody to Eileen 
Howard? This court should review de novo the legal question of 
whether the trial court exercised its discretion based on a correct 
understanding of the law. Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P. 2d 857, 859 
(Utah 1979); Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). The underlying custody award is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982). 
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Howard advanced this argument at the beginning of trial and in 
closing arguments. (R. 526-27, 1101.) 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Howard is not aware of any statutes or rules whose interpre-
tation is determinative of the issues raised. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a civil paternity action. 
The only disputed issue at trial was custody of the minor child, 
Clel Howard. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Jerry 
Duncan, the natural father, filed his paternity action September 
18, 1991, alleging that the mother, Eileen Howard, should be 
awarded custody but that Duncan should receive visitation rights. 
(R. 2-6.) Howard initially disputed Duncan's paternity (R. 27-29), 
but abandoned that defense following blood tests. 
On February 2, 1993, Duncan filed a motion seeking an order 
directing Howard to show cause why Duncan should not be granted 
temporary custody. (R. 53.) The court issued the order to show 
cause. (R. 56-57.) The affidavit (R. 50-52) supporting the motion 
claimed that Clel was then in Pennsylvania with Howard and his 
maternal grandmother, Sandra Thorderson, and that Mrs. Thorderson 
would not allow Clel to return to Utah with Howard. Duncan further 
claimed that although he wanted to be with his son, he "would never 
interfere with [Howard]'s right to be with him as well." (R. 51.) 
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Thordersons had previously filed a petition in Pennsylvania 
seeking custody of Clel. In a telephone conference call between 
the Pennsylvania judge, the Utah domestic relations commissioner, 
and counsel for the parties, the courts decided that Utah would 
retain jurisdiction over the matter. (R. 58, 64.) Sandra 
Thorderson then joined the Utah action as a defendant. (R. 95.) 
The order to show cause was heard before the domestic 
relations commissioner on June 17, 1993 (R. 100), and resulted in 
a recommendation that Clel remain with the Thordersons pending 
final resolution of the action, but that he travel to Utah for one 
month visitation with Duncan and one month with Howard. (R. 101-
05.) Howard and Mrs. Thorderson both objected to the recommenda-
tion (R. 106-08, 113-50), but the district court sustained the 
recommendation. (R. 153, 154.) 
Sandra Thorderson's husband, Larry Thorderson, joined as a 
defendant (R. 188-89), and the Thordersons filed a petition for 
custody. (R. 180-87.) Howard responded to the petition. (R. 151-
53.) Duncan did not answer the petition or ever formally amend his 
petition to seek custody. Duncan did file a motion seeking 
temporary custody of Clel (R. 191) , but that motion was denied. (R. 
254.) 
The case was tried before the Honorable John A. Rokich on 
September 28-30, 1994. (R. 338-40.) On December 5, 1994, the 
court entered a Memorandum Decision holding that Duncan should be 
awarded custody. (R. 386-94.) Finding of Fact and Conclusions of 
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Law (R. 429-34) and a Paternity Order (R. 427-28) were entered 
February 8, 1995. 
C. Statement of Facts2. 
Eileen Howard and Jerry Duncan lived together in Cedar City, 
Utah, for four or five months starting in the fall of 1987, while 
they were working together at Brian Head ski resort. (R. 591-92.) 
Duncan had been married twice3 before, and had two children from 
his first marriage. (R. 649-50.) Duncan moved to seek other 
employment, and the parties split up. (R. 592-93.) Clel James 
Howard was born to Eileen Howard on October 12, 1988. (R. 2, 27.) 
At that time, Howard was living with her mother and stepfather, 
Sandra and Larry Thorderson, in Salt Lake City, Utah. Howard 
nursed and cared for Clel, with some assistance from Mrs. 
Thorderson, for approximately nine months. (R. 1068.) With Mrs. 
2The discussion of facts below is not intended to be compre-
hensive, but to only present a general overview of the facts 
important to Howard's argument. In particular, there are several 
statements in the trial court's Findings of Fact which are not 
supported by the evidence. For example, the findings state that 
Duncan has two adult children from a prior marriage. (R. 430 f 7.) 
In fact, the record indicates the children were three and four 
years old at the time of Duncan's divorce in 1984, and they would 
therefore still be minors. (R. 652, 664.) Paragraph 14 of the 
Findings (R. 431) asserts that Howard abandoned Clel when he was 
three months old. This contradicts paragraph 5 of the Findings, 
and is contrary to the evidence that Howard, Clel, and the 
Thordersons all lived together until September 1992, when Clel was 
nearly four years old, and that Howard cared for and helped support 
Clel during that time. (R. 857, 862, 1068.) There are other 
similar errors. These errors are generally not critical to 
Howard's argument and will not be addressed further. 
3He had married again by the time of trial. (R. 633.) 
5 
Thorderson's encouragement, Howard then obtained employment and 
Mrs. Thorderson took over more of the care of Clel. (R. 1068-69.) 
Howard notified Duncan, who was then living in Texas, of 
Clel's birth by letter dated January 17, 1989. (R. 595.) Howard 
then moved back to Utah. (R. 596.) He visited with Clel approxi-
mately every other Wednesday for several months (R. 1014), until he 
switched to a job with an irregular schedule. (R. 603, 618, 1015.) 
Visitation then became more sporadic because Duncan frequently 
would not give sufficient advance notice of his desire to visit, 
and Mrs. Thorderson and Clel would be unable or unwilling to 
accommodate Duncan's requests. (R. 1015-16.) 
Thordersons and Howard moved to Pennsylvania in April 1992. 
Howard and Clel traveled to Utah twice during the summer of 1992 to 
allow Duncan to visit with Clel. (R. 622.) During the second 
visit, in September 1992, Howard decided to stay in Utah with Clel. 
(R. 623.) Duncan commenced having Clel overnight for visitation 
about once a week. (R. 625.) In November 1992, just before 
Thanksgiving, Mrs. Thorderson took Clel back to Pennsylvania for 
the holidays. (R. 626, 1043.) The plan at that time was that 
Howard come go to Pennsylvania for Christmas and take Clel back to 
Utah with her. (R. 1043-44.) 
Thordersons noticed significant changes in Clel when he 
returned to Pennsylvania in November 1992 (R. 1011) , and in January 
1993 determined to seek custody themselves and did not let Clel 
return to Utah. (R. 1044.) Howard remained in Utah to gain some 
6 
independence to enab 1 e her to be a better parent (R, 1 071 ) 1 : m i, t 
telephoned and wrot«~- '"Mr- • - J v:i sited h :i m i n Pennsylvania 
c i 2) c .1 i ::i :li i: :i ! J tali as described 
below, She moved bac>. l . Pennsylvania i i: it June 1 994 to be with 
Clel. 
I eoruar
 (1 .ill w learning that Clel would remai i I :i n 
Pennsylvania v*. i \ 'I hordersons, Duncan sough' visitation rights or 
temporary custody. TK~ ~^:rt v.1 timtelv ordered that riel 
1 ...g 
month with Hov^ i* i. ; 10 1-"1 11 • JK- return-. A -. Pennsyl-
vania followir^ ^hn4" visitation with severe disorder* ncluding 
oppos . .-._ separation anx... ,*sjrder, and 
post-traumatic stress disorder, (P. '*:>•.) -\e woui-- u.. i^* -' rages 
upon very minor ---—>t —- ^ ^ ^ i r n r ^ snver~ ^ood phobias, ana nad 
a n ijiiiidziiiij li . ) 
The court ordered an additional visitatio . *i M I J I C^4. ,K. 
300.) Clel's thprioist _ - ^ e 
intensive therapy t.c prepare * . ,
 t ., . ,,,. t ,he 
visitation was also monitored by herapist ) 
The changes i* ! ] *v unau vis^4" vr»r* ^ n~ severe <x& the 
prior year, regress .. , . ..raring .^ i.o sr^^e ^nd 
started eatinu i^ri tollowirnj v,at visit. ^. 974.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Eileen Howard dearly loves her son and seeks his best 
interests of her son, and believes that currently requires that 
Clel live with his maternal grandparents, Larry and Sandra 
Thorderson. Howard therefore supports the arguments made in 
Thordersons' brief in addition to those set forth below. 
The trial court abused its discretion by not considering the 
best interests of the child, but instead applying a presumption in 
favor of a natural parent. That presumption does not apply to 
exclude a grandparent, particularly where the grandparent has 
essentially been the primary caretaker of the child since birth. 
Rather than remand this case for reconsideration without 
applying the presumption, this Court should remand with instruc-
tions to award custody to the Thordersons. The overwhelming weight 
of the evidence compels such an award. 
Alternatively, this Court should remand with instructions to 
consider an award of custody to Howard contingent on her living 
with Thordersons. The trial court refused to even consider such an 
arrangement, based on a mistaken assumption that it was beyond the 
court's power to enforce. Expert testimony showed that such an 
award would be in Clel's best interest if custody could not be 
granted directly to Thordersons. The refusal to consider a 
contingent award to Howard was an abuse of discretion. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE HUTCHISON PRESUMPTION DOES NOT APPLY 
AGAINST A GRANDPARENT WHO HAS BEEN 
THE PRIMARY CARETAKER OF A CHILD SINCE BIRTH. 
Utah Code Ann. - • 4' : 
consider the Lx L. j.icruwi ... . . ne 
findings nstant cast however, MO : r even use the phrase 
"best interestr * . t 
transfer . . _,; . ^ btd ii.;.cicaiy but 
instead, citing Hutchison v. Hutchisu:., 64 i\2d 2~ (u? ; 
relied o*~ - nr^^irrtion m LdivuL 01 - *~ 
Hutchison siaies: 
In a controversy over custody, the para-
mount consideration is the best interest of 
the child, but where one party to the contro-
versy is a nonparent, there is a presumption 
in favor of the natural parent. Walton v. 
Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 P.2d 97 (1946). This 
presumption recognizes "the natural right and 
authority of the parent to the child's custody 
. . . ." State in re Jennings, 2 0 Utah 2d 50, 
52, 432 P. 2d 879, 880 (1967)', It is rooted in 
the common experience of mankind, which 
teaches that parent and child normally share a 
strong attachment or bond for each other, that 
a natural parent will normally sacrifice 
personal interest and welfare for the child's 
benefit, and that a natural parent is normally 
more sympathetic and understanding and better 
able to win the confidence and love of the 
child than anyone else. Walton v. Coffman, 
• •• -• I — P. ?d at 103. 
Hutchison, 64° /; •- . OLJ..'-. Mtieci underlining added), 
Othe > i • - a J y z e d 
Thorderson&>' j j n e i a t pay«t> J ^ - O D , c j e a r l y si v * * *- s p resump-
9 
tion does not apply against a grandparent, particularly one who has 
been the primary caretaker since the child7s birth. The Court 
recognized that "[t]he affection of a grandparent can safely be 
said to be no less in depth than parental affection." Tuckev v. 
Tuckev. 649 P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 1982). 
No expert witness at trial testified that, based on circum-
stances existing at the time of trial, the best interest of Clel 
would be served by transferring custody to Duncan. To the 
contrary, even Mr. Otanez, who advocated changing custody to 
Duncan, acknowledged he had concerns about the effect of such a 
change on Clel's stability. (R. 571.) Dr. Steven Richfield, who 
was familiar with Clel's current circumstances and emotional state, 
was more explicit. He testified that "it would be emotionally 
devastating to uproot him from the security that he has established 
in the home of the grandparents," and that it would likely "lead to 
antisocial behavior later in childhood and adulthood as well as 
[Clel] retreating into a shell of internal preoccupations." (R. 
932. See also R. 956-60.) 
Mr. Otanez was not sufficiently informed to testify concerning 
Clel's best interests at the time of trial. (R. 587.) Duncan 
himself was the only other witness who had some personal knowledge 
of both Thordersons and Howard and who testified that the best 
interests of Clel would be served by granting custody to Duncan. 
Given the self-serving nature of Duncan's testimony and the 
overwhelming testimony to the contrary, including the undisputed 
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evidence that Thordersons hac I . , .man aretaxers since 
birth, this court should jLeuidiiu wiui ui1 ^ ' l o 
Husbdi I. 
A similar situation was addressed in Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 
P. 2d 78 (Utah Ct , App. l^ ii'i) 'PI i irtieG* ono ( hi 1<1 i \t- i t . •»ir,it 
seven years old rfhcii Lhe parties separated, "I lie mother had been 
the primary caretaker prior to the separation, but the father was 
awarded temporary custody, Tho case was tried I n ypars latpr, 
A In •' expeil.M iomnil IJ •JIII parties Lo be capable parents, but each 
party had an expert hi his or her favor, The trial court gave 
little or no weiqht to the fact that tho father had her-'n rust nil i an 
f .. J-*«IU^-W; ...wistody to the mot 
This Court .r appeal reversed ann directed that custody be 
awarded to th-- pather M M ^ ' r : r l : 
Where m e call is a close one, we relieve the 
child's interests will best be promoted by 
maintaining the prior, stable and healthy 
arrangement. That is, where the evidence was 
otherwise inconclusive—if anything, favoring 
Vladimir somewhat—the paramount consideration 
of stability conclusively tips the scale in 
Vladimir,s favor and warrants awarding ci istody 
to hi it,- as a matter of law 
776 P.2d at 8 3-84. 
The interests of stability i i i tl: lis case- . ..Kewise demand that 
custody be awarded to Thordersons as a natter of law. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER 
ANY TYPE OP CUSTODY AWARD INVOLVING HOWARD. 
The expert witnesses acknowledged Clel's love for his mother 
and her importance in his life, but expressed reservations about 
her current ability to have sole custody of Clel without assis-
tance. Howard recognized that she needed help in parenting, and 
attempted to argue that she should be awarded custody contingent on 
her living with her mother, Sandra Thorderson. Even before hearing 
the evidence, the trial court refused to even hear arguments 
concerning such an arrangement. (R. 526-27.) At the conclusion of 
the evidence, in a conference in chambers, the court again refused 
to consider any custody award to Howard contingent on her living 
with Thordersons, claiming that the court lacked authority to 
enforce such an order.4 
Although a trial court is given considerable discretion in 
awarding custody, that discretion must be exercised within the 
confines of legal standards. Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 
87 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . Where a court makes a discretionary 
ruling based on a misunderstanding of the law, "the party adversely 
affected thereby is entitled to have the error rectified and a 
4While the conference in chambers is not reported, the record 
does reflect that the conference was held because the court did not 
want counsel presenting arguments concerning whether Howard should 
have custody (R. 1092), and that in chambers and following in open 
court the judge curtly refused to even allow arguments advocating 
any type of custody arrangement involving Howard. (R. 1101.) 
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proper adjudication under correct principles of 1 aw." Ferris v. 
Jennings, 595 F\ ?d f -
Several ex^ i-i i, witnesses testn±c~ ...L ...xdi. Todd Otanez, who 
performed h 1 s evaluati on d
 tr i nq the 1 v -- 3 .sit ^ :: che 
onl* "' wno rr'"*:—r-r^.rd uiicn Duncan 
C : compared or.*;, .;-ncan an,, iiowaia, u.»u .ttcii^. •: o 
determine whether Clej ' •: i>est interests would -w ej by 
remaining *•<+-- * nordersons ^n. , ' i'" > i • - I 
tl id - --•mir.tndation was based in pal L . » ^ni j 
was not then, living v..*' Thordersons, wh • • Clei's primary 
caretakers and with whom '' - * - ' 
be . ^e.(? t*A v interests basea ,;; :**• . arrent circumstance of 
Howard ! * — •• * •^rdersor" 
imonv a . _
 4„ 4 . „.^w« •; -tu. . if there was some 
legal reason *h*' ! nordersons could not b-• awarded custody, the 
best interest!- -f Cl~l » 
H O W L ......... ... ._ . .. .„ „. ; i ...oiaersons. (R. 80^-ivi.; 
All o! thv witnesses acknowledged that Thordersons had been Clel's 
primary caret a1"-~? e — c-*- - - ::ii <::>i led 
t h e - -l'_ L :_ - . . .. - . ^ U ^ ^ J .
 A j ^ a i e l u l C i t i . 
The t r i a l court ,earL\ V i . ' - .J thori ty ' • • •. i-> ^ ,u d ^* 
custod^ "ont inae^ + 
Sukin v. bjki ; . . , . . . • . . j , 992 ; ; Curry v. 
Curry
 p ^ I ^  •* , _ _ _ ^ . _ J - - - # b 4.3 ( l ^ ^ w , . A***^ L I X Q A V^OUI L 
here abused its discretion by refusing to even consider such an 
arrangement. Sukin, supra. If this Court holds that the Hutchison 
presumption does apply to preclude a direct award of custody to 
Thordersons, the Court should remand with instructions to consider 
whether Clel's interests would best be served by an award of 
custody to Howard, contingent on her continuing to live with 
Thordersons. 
CONCLUSION 
The best interests of Clel would be served by awarding custody 
to the Thordersons. The evidence compels that conclusion, and this 
Court should remand with directions to award custody to Thordersons 
subject to reasonable visitation rights to Duncan. 
Alternatively, this Court should remand for reconsideration 
without applying any presumption in favor of a natural parent, and 
should direct that the trial court consider an award to Howard 
contingent on her living with Thordersons. The witnesses uniformly 
acknowledged that transferring custody away from Thordersons would 
be traumatic. The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to 
even consider alternate methods to have Clel remain with 
Thordersons, who have been his primary caretakers since birth. 
DATED this /£" day of December, 1995. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, foj 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant Howard 
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APPENDIX "A" 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Third Juuioixl District 
DEC 0 5 1994 
SAL J LAKL1 C/UUN TY ^ - " " ^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT DapuiyCtork 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JEROME K. DUNCAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EILEEN K. HOWARD, et al.. 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. $10905919 
This case was tried on September 28, 29, 30, 1994. Plaintiff 
was represented by Dean B. Ellis. Defendants Sandra and Larry 
Thorderson were represented by John Spencer Snow. Defendant Eileen 
Howard was represented by Leslie Slaugh. The Court heard oral 
testimony, admitted documentary evidence and reviewed in detail the 
custody evaluations submitted by the respective parties. The Court 
took the matter under advisement. 
FACTS 
The child, Clel Howard, who is the subject matter of these 
proceedings is the natural child of Jerome Duncan and Eileen 
Howard. Clel was born out of wedlock on October 12, 1988. 
Plaintiff learned of Clel's birth three months after Clel's 
birth and commenced paying $150 per month for Clel's support. 
DUNCAN V, HOWARD PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff paid support for about four and one-half years and 
established a regular routine of weekly visits with Clel. 
In 1991, plaintiff filed a paternity action and established 
that he was the natural father of Clel. Upon the establishment of 
paternity, visitation with Clel was resumed until April 7, 1992 
when defendant Hov/ard allowed Clel to live with his natural 
grandmother in Pennsylvania. 
A series of hearings were held in the Utah court and in the 
Pennsylvania court regarding visitation and custody of Clel during 
the pendency of this action. Defendants Thorderson were granted 
custodial rights to Clel with the final resolution of custody and 
visitation issues. 
Defendant Howard left Clel when he was nine months old with 
his maternal grandmother. Defendant Howard did not exhibit an 
interest in Clel. Defendant did not develop parental skills or 
develop a bond with Clel. Defendant's lifestyle did not create an 
environment where Clel could be nurtured, loved, shown affection or 
attention that would allow him to have the normal mother/son 
relationship. 
Defendant left the responsibility of raising Clel to her 
mother, who with her husband assumed the role of parents for Clel. 
l*0€8 
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Plaintiff, Duncan, is now in his third marriage and exhibited 
a lack of stability in his early adulthood. Plaintiff had two 
adult children by a prior marriage. Plaintiff has not maintained 
a relationship with these children. 
Plaintiff is presently married to Diane Duncan who was 
previously married and had three children by her first marriage. 
She is employed at Stauffers in Utah County. 
Plaintiff is a college graduate and is also employed at 
Stauffers. Plaintiff and his present wife have adequate living 
quarters and income to provide for Clel. 
The defendants Thorderson have had custody of Clel since April 
of 1992 and have assumed the role of parenting Clel. Mrs. 
Thorderson was previously married and had four children by her 
first marriage. This is Mr. Thorderson's first marriage. He is 52 
years old and Mrs. Thorderson is 41 years old. Defendants have a 
stable marriage, and more than adequate living facilities. 
Defendants Thorderson provide a stable environment for Clel. 
As a result of the instability in Clel's life, he has 
developed emotional problems which will require continued therapy 
in order for him to adjust to the custodial and visitation orders 
entered by the Court. 
0 0 0 3 8 
DUNCAN V. HOWARD PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ARGUMENT 
In custody disputes between a parent and a non-parent, the 
Utah State Supreme Court has ruled that there is a presumption in 
favor of custody being awarded to the parent which can only be 
rebutted by showing that: (1) no strong mutual bond exists; (2) 
the parent has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or 
her own interests and welfare for the child's interest and welfare; 
and (3) the parent lacks a sympathy for and understanding of the 
child that is characteristic of parents generally, Hutchinson v. 
Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982). 
Clel's strongest bond appears to be with his maternal 
grandmother which is understandable, because he was placed with her 
shortly after birth. However, his bonding to plaintiff has been 
hampered because plaintiff has not had the opportunity to develop 
the bonding relationship with the child. The review of the file 
and the transcript of those proceedings evidences the resistance 
plaintiff has met in establishing a close relationship with Clel. 
The testimony of the custody evaluators in this case led the Court 
to believe that with continued therapy sessions, Clel can develop 
a strong bond with his father. 
Clel has suffered a great deal of trauma in his life because 
of his mother abandoning him at three months of age, and not being 
0 0 G 3 S 9 
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allowed to establish a normal relationship with his father. As a 
result of the trauma in his life, Clel suffers from emotional 
problems which are presently being treated and must be treated for 
an extensive period of time. 
Plaintiff understands that Clel must continue in a therapy 
program in order for Clel to overcome the fears and anxieties he 
has developed as a result of the custodial issue. Plaintiff and 
defendants have expressed a willingness to continue to work with 
therapists to resolve Clel's emotional problems. 
Plaintiff has demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his own 
interest and welfare for the child's. It is evident that plaintiff 
cared about Clel and is willing to sacrifice his own interests for 
the child's, however, the defendants were not cooperative and did 
not further a father/son relationship between Clel and plaintiff. 
There was no significant evidence that plaintiff lacked the 
sympathy for and understanding of the child that is characteristic 
of parents generally. The Court believes that plaintiff 
understands the problems that have been created by Clel being born 
out of wedlock, the abandonment of Clel by his mother, and the lack 
of regular visitation by him with Clel. 
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Plaintiff's extended family testified about the importance of 
family and are desirous of making Clel an integral pari: of the 
extended family. 
The Court has considered Clel's feelings in this case and 
understands the apprehension he may have in establishing a new 
home, a new environment and the sense of security he may have with 
the defendants Thordersons. However, the Court is convinced that 
with the cooperation of all of the parties and the continued 
therapy sessions for Clel, that Clel can make the adjustment to new 
surroundings satisfactorily. 
Clel would probably prefer to remain with defendants 
Thorderson, because they have been the primary caretakers for most 
of his life. However, defendants Thordersons created much of the 
problem in Clel accepting his father because of their resistance to 
allowing plaintiff to become the father he desired to be. The fact 
that he had to file a lawsuit is indicative of the defendant's 
resistance to allow plaintiff to be a father. 
There is no evidence that plaintiff is now engaged in immoral 
activity. The Court believes that the plaintiff has matured from 
the time he met defendant Howard and is a much more stable person 
than he was in 1988. 
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Granted, plaintiff does not enjoy the same economic status of 
the Thordersons, but he has the financial means by which to 
adequately provide for Clel's needs. 
In this case plaintiff and defendants are of the same 
religious faith and are active members, assuring Clel of compatible 
religious training with plaintiff and defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court awards custody to plaintiff, subject to the 
following conditions. 
1. Clel shall remain with the Thordersons until the end of 
the present school year. Ten days after the school year ends, Clel 
shall be delivered to plaintiff at Salt Lake City at plaintiff/s 
expense. 
2. Clel shall remain in the therapy program that he is 
presently enrolled, and the therapist shall prepare Clel for the 
transition of custody to his father. Plaintiff and defendants 
Thorderson shall bear the costs equally. 
3. Plaintiffs therapist and Thorderson's therapist shall 
communicate and establish a treatment program and a visiting 
schedule for defendant Howard and defendants Thorderson to visit 
with Clel which shall be submitted to the Court for approval by the 
end of the school year. 
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4. Plaintiff and defendant shall name their therapists 
within 3 0 days from the date of entry of this Judgment. 
Each party shall bear their own fees and costs. 
Plaintiff's counsel shall prepare Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of law, and a Judgment in accordance with this 
Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this _day of December, 1994. 
o n I) i) (tt- A 6 P-fL-uJ^ 
\30m A. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this O ' ' day of 
December, 1994: 
Maddi-Jane Sobel 
Dean B. Ellis 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 600 S. Market Street 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Leslie Slaugh 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
John Spencer Snow 
Attorney for Defendants Thorderson 
261 East 300 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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APPENDIX "B" 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Dean B- Ellis, #4976 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3600 South Market Street 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Telephone: (801) 965-8605 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
S*U IAKL. bOUNlY 
By ^ J - k - i ! STATE OF UTAH 
CeputyC/erk 
JEROME K5 DUNCAN, 
VS 5 
Plaintiff, 
EILEEN M< HOWARD, SANDRA 
THORDERSON and the STATE 
OF UTAH, Depts of Human Services, 
Defendants . 
FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Judge Rokich 
Case No. 910905919PA 
This case was tried on September 28, 29, 30, 1994. 
Plaintiff was represented by Dean B* Ellis. Defendants Sandra 
and Larry Thorderson were represented by John Spencer Snow. 
Defendant Eileen Howard was represented by Leslie Slaugh. The 
Court heard oral testimony, admitted documentary evidence and 
reviewed in detail the custody evaluations submitted by the 
respective partiess After taking the matter underadvjsement, 
the court enters as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
la The child, d e l Howard, who is the subject matter of 
these proceedings is the natural child of Jerome Duncan and 
Eileen Howards Clel was born out of wedlock on October 12, 19883 
2. Plaintiff learned of Clel's birth three montns after 
Clel's birth and commenced paying $150 per month for Clelfs 
support for about fou^ and one-half years and established a 
regular routine of weekly visits with Clel« 
3a In 1991, plaintiff filed a paternity action and 
established that he was the natural father of Clel. Upon the 
establishment of paternity, visitation with Clel was resumed 
until April 7, 1992 when defendant Howard allowed Clel to live 
2 
with his natural grandmother in Pennsylvaniaa 
48 A series of hearings were held in the Utah court and 
in the Pennsylvania court regarding visitation and custody of 
Clel during the pendency of this action3 Defendants Thorderson 
were granted custodial eights to Clel with the final resolution 
of custody and visitation issues reserved for trial. 
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6« Defendant left the responsibility of raising Clel to 
her mother, who with her husband assumed the role of parents for 
Clel. 
7a Plaintiff, Duncan, is now in his third marriage and 
exhibited a lack of stability in his early adulthood. Plaintiff 
had two adult children by a prior marriage; Plaintiff has not 
majntained a relationship with these children* 
8» Plaintiff JS presently married to Diane Duncan who 
was previously married and had three children by her first 
marriage. Diane Duncan is employed at Stouffers in Utah County. 
9« Plaintiff is a college graduate and as albO employed 
at Stoufferss Plaintiff and his present wife have adequate 
living quarters and income to provide for Clel? 
10s The defendants Thorderson have had custody of Clel 
since April of 1992 and have assumed the role of parenting 
ClelR Mrss Thorderson was previously married and had four 
children by her first marriages This is Mr. Thorderson's firsc 
marriage; He is 41 years old and Mrs
 8 Thorderson is 52 years 
old. Defendants have a stable marriage, and more than adequate 
living facilities. Defendants Thorderson provide a stable 
environment for Clel» 
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11a As a result of the instability in Clel's life, he 
has developed emotional problems which will require continued 
therapy in order for him to adjust to the custodial and 
visitation orders entered by the Courts 
12« In custody disputes between a parent and a 
non-parent, the Utah State Supreme Court has ruled that there, is 
a presumption in favor of custody being awarded to the parent 
which can only be rebutted by showing that: (1) no strong 
mutual bond exists; (2) the parent has not demonstrated a 
willingness to sacrifice his or her own interests and welfare 
for the child's interest and welfare; and (3) the parent lacks 
a sympathy for and understanding of the child that is 
characteristic of parents generally* Hutchinson v5 Hutchinson, 
649 P*2d 38 (Utah 1982)
 ; 
13a Clel's strongest bond appears to be with his 
maternal grandmother which is understandable, because he was 
placed with her shortly after births However, his bonding to 
plaintiff has been hampered because plaintiff has not had the 
opportunity to develop the bonding relationship with the child3 
The review of the file and the transcript of these proceedings 
evidences the resistance plaintiff has met in establishing a 
close relationship with Clels The testimony of the custody 
evaluators in this case led the Court to believe that with 
continued therapy sessions, Clel can develop a strong bond with 
his fathers 
14s Clel has suffered a great deal of trauma in his life 
because of his mother abandoning him at three months of age, and 
not being allowed to establish a normal relationship with his 
fathers As a result of the trauma in his life, Clel suffers 
from emotional problems which are presently being treated and 
must be treated for an extensive period of time* 
155 Plaintiff understands that Clel must continue in a 
therapy program in order for Clel to overcome the fears and 
anxieties he has developed as a result of the custodial issue« 
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Plaintiff and defendants have expressed a willingness to 
continue to work with therapists to resolve Clel's emotional 
problems
 8 
16s Plaintiff has demonstrated a willingness to 
sacrifice his own interest and welfare for the child1**. It is 
evident that plaintiff cared about Clel and is willing to 
sacrifice his own interests for the child's, however, the 
defendants were not cooperative and did not further a father/son 
relationship between Clel and plaintiff* 
17a There was no significant evidence that plaintiff 
lacked the sympathy for and understanding of the child that is 
characteristic of parents generally. The Court believes that 
plaintiff understands the problems that have been created by 
Clel being born out of wedlock, the abandonment of Clel by his 
mother, and the lack of regular visitation by him with Clel* 
188 Plaintiff's extended family testified about the 
importance of family and are desirous of making Clel an integral 
part of the extended family* 
193 The Court has considered Clel's feelings in this 
case and understands the apprehension he may have in 
establishing a new home, a new environment and the sense of 
security he may have with the defendants Thordersons. However, 
the Court is convinced that with the cooperation of all of the 
parties and the continued therapy sessions for Clel, that Clel 
can make the adjustment to new surroundings satisfactorily. 
20* Clel would probably prefer to remain W3 tn defendants 
Thorderson, because they have been the primary caretakers for 
most of his life* However, defendants Thordersons created much 
of the problem in Clel accepting his father because of their 
resistance to allowing plaintiff to become the father he desired 
to be s The fact that he had to file a lawsuit is indicative of 
the defendants1 resistance to allow plaintiff to be a fathers 
213 There is no evidence that plaintiff is now engaged 
in immoral activity; The Court believes that the plaintiff has 
A A /* f a A 
5 
matured from the time he met defendant Howard and is a much more 
stable person than he wa.3 in 1988* 
225 Granted, plaintiff does not enjoy the same economic 
status of the Thordersons, he has the financial means by which 
to adequately provide for Clel's needs* 
23« In this case plaintiff and defendants are of the 
same religious faith and are active members, assuring Clel of 
compatible religious training with plaintiff and defendants. 
Having made the above findings, the court enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The court awards custody to plaintiff, subject to the 
following conditi ons: 
Is Clel shall remain with the Thordersons until the end 
of the present school years Ten days after the school year 
ends, Clel shall be delivered to plaintiff at Salt Lake City at 
plaintiff's expense« 
2a Clel shall remain in the therapy program that he is 
presently enrolled, and the therapist shall prepare Clel for the 
transition of custody to his fathers Plaintiff and defendants 
Thorderson shall bear the costs equallya 
3a Plaintiff's therapist and Thordersonfs therapist 
shall communicate and establish a treatment program and a 
visiting schedule for defendant Howard and defendants Thorderson 
to visit with Clel which shall be submitted to the Court for 
approval by the end of the school year*, 
4s Plaintiff and Thordersons shall name their 
therapists within 30 days from the date of entry of this 
Judgments 
5. Each party shall !?£££ their own fees and costs. 
Dated this & day of J^ nua$\fl 1995s 
BY THE COURT: 
>^ \ <2$cMJb—v 
JOHN As District J udge\ 
I) i\ a A <> O 
6 
approved: 
t^fJ~~~ 
Jtfjm SPENDER SNOW, A t t o r n e y fo r T h o r d e r s o n s 
a p p r o v e d : 
LESLIE W8 SLAUGH, Attorney for Eileen Howard 
Mailed a true copy of the foregoing this / C/ day of 
January 199/^to John Spencer Snow 261 E 300 S #300, SLC, UT 
84111 and to Leslie W* Slaugh P5Oi Box 778, Provo, UT 84603* 
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APPENDIX "C" 
PATERNITY ORDER 
Dean B, Ellis, #4976 l.;r.Z——-—1-52 4xr 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3600 South Market Street 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Telephone: (801) 965-8605 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT L&tarCOCWTT 
STATE OF UTAH 
IhitO JucJiCiJ District 
FEB 0 8 IJJb 
SAL I L/ute COUNTY ^ 
\ I , t ' v 
Deputy Clerk 
JEROME K« DUNCAN, 
vs i 
Plaintiff, 
EILEEN Ms HOWARD, SANDRA 
THORDERSON and the STATE 
OF UTAH, Dept* of Human Services, 
Defendants
 5 
PATERNITY ORDER 
Judge Rokich 
Case No3 910905919PA 
Having heretofore entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, IT IS NOW HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
Is Plaintiff Jerome Duncan is the natural father and 
defendant Eileen Howard are the natural parents of the minor 
child, Clel Howard born out of wedlock on 10-12-88, 
25 Plaintiff is awarded custody of Clel subject to the 
following conditions: 
a, Clel shall remain with the Thorder^ons until 
the end of the present school years Ten days after the school 
year ends, Clel shall be delivered to plaintiff at Salt Lake 
City at plaintifffs expense, 
b* Clel shall remain in the therapy program that 
he is presently enrolled, and the therapist snail prepare Clel 
for the transition of custody to his father. Plaintiff and 
defendants Thorderson shall bear the costs equally. 
ca Plaintiff's therapist and Thordersoncs 
therapist shall communicate and establish a treatment program 
and a visiting schedule for defendant Howard and defendants 
Thorderson to visit with Clel which shall be submitted to the 
Court for approval by the end of the school year. 
2 
d* Plaintiff and Thordersons shall name their 
therapists within 30 days from the date of entry of this 
Judgment* 
3? Each party shall Jpsar their owi) fees and costs* 
Dated this & day of JMt 
ar their owi) 
oefthb r 1994* 
BY THE COURT: 
JOHN A* ROKlCH, Distri£t_jJudgeJ 
approved: 
J^ tfN SPEN^&R SNOW, Attorney for Thordersons 
approved: 
LESLIE W; SLAUGH, Attorney for Eileen Howard 
Mailed a true copy of the foregoing gom this / day of 
December 1994 to John Spencer Snow 261 E 300 S #300, SLC, UT 
84111 and to Leslie w* Slaugh P*0; Box 778, Provo, UT 84603:. 
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